Denver Law Review
Volume 67
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 25

January 1990

Criminal Procedure
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denver University Law Review, Criminal Procedure, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 701 (1990).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Allen, used a false name on his financial affidavit in order to seek court-appointed counsel in another criminal proceeding
under 18 U.S.C. § 1542. The district court granted Allen's application
and appointed counsel to represent him during plea negotiations and
sentencing. In a subsequent arrest, Allen's true name was learned. As a
result, Allen was prosecuted in the present proceeding and found guilty
of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2). Allen appealed, asserting that:
(1) his use of an alias in the financial affidavit did not constitute a materially false statement in violation of section 1621(2); and (2) the government breached its plea agreement.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the first issue, holding that the government failed to prove materiality, an essential element in establishing
perjury. The court explained that the test for materiality is whether the
false statement has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing the decision required to be made. Materiality must be measured
against the purpose for which the allegedly false statement was made.
The purpose here was limited to Allen's indigence and not extended to
simultaneous inquiries for bail and other factors. The materiality inquiry
was thus limited solely to the impact of the false name on the determination of indigence. The court held that materiality was not shown. The
government failed to prove that the determination of indigence would
have changed had the Allen used his true name. Absent evidence of an
adverse effect on indigence, materiality failed. In addition, the court
failed to address the breach of agreement claim.
Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Archuleta, appealed his conviction of automobile burglary and larceny. Archuleta claimed that the victims' identification of
him while he was sitting handcuffed in the police car was unnecessarily
suggestive and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
The Tenth Circuit stated that even though the district court found
the procedure unnecessarily suggestive, the appropriate analysis for
constitutionality involves balancing the reliability of the identification itself against the "corruptive effect" of the identification procedure. After
weighing the totality of circumstances surrounding the identification,
the court held that the evidence was admissible because: (1) the victims
had ample opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime;
(2) the victims' attention was focused on the defendant; (3) the victims
were accurate and unequivocal in their description of the defendant; and
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(4) the identification occurred only thirty minutes after the crime. The

court affirmed dismissal of the habeas corpus petition.
United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Baggett, was convicted of simple possession of heroin
under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and of three counts of using a telephone to
facilitate the distribution of heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Baggett
appealed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict on the possession count, and that section 843(b) does not
apply to individuals who use the telephone to arrange drug purchases
for their own personal use.
The Tenth Circuit held that to support a conviction for possession
where there is no direct evidence of possession, circumstantial evidence
must be presented which is strong enough to support an inference that a
defendant actually possessed the drug in question. The circumstantial
evidence must include testimony linking the defendant to an observed
substance that a jury can infer to be a narcotic. Here, there was no evidence that Baggett possessed a substance and that the substance was a
narcotic. Neither the detective nor the narcotics agent in the case saw
money or narcotics exchanged between Baggett and the suspected drug
dealer. The court found that because illegal possession of controlled
drugs by individuals for their own personal use is a misdemeanor rather
than a felony, Baggett could not be convicted for facilitation under section 843(b). The court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the statute,
intended to distinguish between distributors and simple possessors.
Baggett's conviction was reversed.
United States v. Beryhil, 880 F.2d 275
Author: Judge Barrett
Concurrence: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Berryhill, appealed an order of the district court. Berryhill argued that the district court erred in: (1) sentencing him to 300
years with a minimum term of 99 years before eligibility for parole;
(2) failing to conduct adequate voir dire; (3) denying his motion for mistrial; and (4) failing to grant his motion to suppress in-court identification evidence.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the 300-year sentence and minimum
term of 99 years before eligibility for parole because it was within the
prescribed statutory limits of 18 U.S.C. sections 1201 and 4205(b)(1).
The court further upheld the district court's voir dire and its ruling denying Berryhill's motion for mistrial. The court stated that the decision on
both issues was within the sound discretion of the district court and
would not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion. In addition, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Berryhill's motion to suppress in-court identification evidence of Berryhill by witnesses who had

1990]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

previously viewed photographic displays. The court found that the photographic displays were not impermissibly suggestive.
United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Bishop, appealed his conviction, daiming the district
court improperly denied: (1) his motion to suppress evidence because
the warrrant used to retrieve it had been obtained without probable
cause; (2) his motion for new trial because of the prosecution's late disclosure of impeachment evidence; and (3) his motion to acquit for insufficient evidence.
The Tenth Circuit declined to resolve whether there was probable
cause supporting the wan-ant, finding that the F.B.I. agents' conduct fell
within the "good faith exception" to the probable cause rule. With regard to the impeachment evidence, the court held that there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the
prosecution to turn over material evidence favorable to a defendant
when requested. There is no due process violation where the impeachment evidence is disclosed to the defense during the trial and the defendant makes a tactical decision not to use it. The court also affirmed
the district court's denial of Bishop's motion for acquittal, holding that a
reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was remanded for resentencing under the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Bryant, 892 F.2d 1466
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Bryant, appealed his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Bryant argued that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to define "wanton and reckless disregard for human life" as an
element of involuntary manslaughter. Bryant also contended that the
district court violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause when
it based its sentence on the trial judge's view of the evidence which was
contrary to that of the jury.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to apply the common understanding of
"wanton and reckless." The court reasoned that this gave the jurors sufficient guidance without Bryant's proposed jury instruction on the
meaning of the term. The court also stated that there is no substantial
authority for the proposition that Bryant's proposed instruction on a
"right to arm" bore a material relationship to the issue of guilt or innocence. In addition, the court found that Bryant's double jeopardy rights
were not violated even though the sentencing judge disagreed with the
jury's determination. The court explained that there was no suggestion
that the trial judge considered non-existent or constitutionally invalid
prior convictions. The trial court, therefore, acted within its discretion in
sentencing Bryant to the statutory maximum period of incarceration al-
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lowable for involuntary manslaughter. The judgment and sentence were
affirmed.
United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Buchanan, was convicted of conspiracy and manufacturing and possessing an unregistered firearm. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Buchanan sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging that failure of the United States to disclose a personal
relationship between an investigator from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, ("Tilley"), and Buchanan's former wife, Whitten,
was prejudicial error in violation of the Brady rule. The district court
granted Buchanan a new trial, and the United States appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that failure to disclose
the Tilley-Whitten relationship did not violate the Brady rule. The Brady
rule states that suppression of evidence by the prosecution favorable to
an accused, when it has been requested, violates due process when the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment regardless of whether
the prosecution acted in good faith. Buchanan requested, in discovery,
"any evidence which might be used for impeachment of any witness for
the prosecution at the time of trial." The court determined that since
neither Tilley nor Whitten was a chief witness, the failure to disclose
impeachment evidence did not warrant granting of a new trial. Moreover, the court reasoned that neither Tilley's nor Whitten's credibility
was material to the question of Buchanan's guilt. The district court's
decision to grant a new trial was reversed.
Buck v. Maschner, 878 F.2d 344
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Buck, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging improper introduction of evidence from a prior alleged molestation of children charge for which he had been tried and acquitted. The district
court denied Buck's petition. Buck appealed, asserting violation of his
constitutional rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that the collateral estoppel requirement of
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause barred the evidence from
admission in the instant case since the State impermissibly sought to
prove exactly what it failed to prove in the previous trial. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
United States v. Burton, 888 F.2d 682
Per Curian
Defendant, Burton, was convicted for distributing handbills without
a permit on property leased by the federal government. Burton admitted committing the acts in violation of 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.309 (1986);
however, she argued that pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 318, the government
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was without jurisdiction to prosecute her for such acts since the property
was leased, and thus not owned, by the federal government. The district
court denied Burton's motion to dismiss.
The Tenth Circuit held that the government had jurisdiction to
prosecute. The court stated that the jurisdiction restriction of 40 U.S.C.
§ 318 was amended by an appropriations act, which expanded the government's jurisdiction to areas under its charge and control. Consequently, the government could enforce regulations on property merely
leased by the United States. The court further held that the appropriations act which expanded the government's ju'isdiction constituted a
proper exercise of power under the necessary and proper clause of the
United States Constitution. The act has a legitimate end, is within the
scope of the Constitution, and is plainly adapted to achieve its end. The
decision of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436
Author: Judge Barrett
The United States appealed the district court's order granting defendant Carreon's motion to suppress evidence. A United States Customs Inspector ("the Inspector") found approximately fifty kilograms of
marijuana in Carreon's truck during a search at the United States-Mexico border. At issue was whether the search and seizure violated Carreon's fourth amendment rights.
The Tenth Circuit stated that a border search is an exception to the
fourth amendment probable-cause warrant requirement. Extension of a
routine border search is warranted if it is based on "reasonable suspicion" justified by a particularized and objective basis. The court held
that the facts did establish a "reasonable suspicion" justifying the Inspector's search and, therefore, the district court's order granting the
motion to suppress was clearly erroneous. The order was reversed and
the case was remanded for trial.
Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388
Author: Judge Anderson
Following his conviction, petitioner Case sought federal habeas relief. The district court conditionally granted Case's petition on the
ground ofjury misconduct, finding that Case's constitutional rights were
violated when he was precluded from a post-verdict voir dire of the jury.
The district court, however, denied relief on a second issue, finding that
Case was properly denied a continuance which, if granted, would have
enabled him to introduce a newly-discovered witness. Respondent,
Mondragon, appealed the juror misconduct issue, and Case appealed
the continuance issue.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the jury misconduct issue and affirmed on the continuance issue. The court held that a presumption of
correctness should be accorded to trial court findings on basic and pri-
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mary facts. Whether or not jurors made or heard improper comments is
a basic and primary fact and, therefore, the district court's findings
should have been given full deference. The district court should have
presumed insufficient proof ofjuror misconduct and denied Case relief.
The court further held that the district court failed to fulfill a requirement when it did not explain its reasons for avoiding the presumption.
Affirming the district court's decision to deny a continuance, the court
stated that Case did not prove whether the denial violated constitutional
principles of due process. Thus, the denial of the continuance was
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Davis, appealed from the district court's dismissal of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that his sixth amendment right to a public trial was violated by the improper exclusion of the
general public and the press from his trial during which he was convicted of raping three sixteen-year-old girls. On request by the prosecution, the district court excluded the public and press during a
complaining witness' testimony without requiring evidence of the witness' condition and without interviewing the witness or her parents.
The district court reasoned that the victim's age required closure, that
Davis would still have the right to confrontation, and that the jury would
be present during the witness' testimony.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court had improperly violated Davis's sixth amendment right to a public trial by failing to articulate specific, reviewable findings adequate to support the
closure. The court stated that the overriding interest standard was not
met because the district court did not: (1) inquire into the factual basis
for the prosecution's assertion that the witness would be harmed unless
the press and public were excluded; and (2) narrowly tailor its order
since no alternatives to the blanket exclusion were considered. The case
was remanded for entry ofjudgment granting habeas relief and vacating
Davis's conviction if the state does not retry Davis within a reasonable
time.
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 884 F.2d 1343
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Various prisoners in state and federal institutions testified as witnesses in separate criminal proceedings before federal tribunals. The
prisoners contended that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)
and (b) (1978) mandated the payment of attendance fees to witnesses
regardless of whether they were incarcerated. The district court denied
the fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress never intended
section 1821 to apply to those incarcerated for criminal acts. Nowhere in
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the express language of the 1978 revision of section 1821 nor in its legislative history did Congress indicate criminal inmates were entitled to a
fee. Additionally, prisoners do not incur financial loss serving as witnesses. Allowing such fees could lead to abuses since inmates could file
suits and subpoena prison friends solely for the purpose of allowing the
witnesses to gain profit and free trips outside prison.
United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d 255
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, United States ("government"), appealed from the district
court's dismissal of three indictments on the ground that the government failed to comply with the district court's discovery orders. Defendants were indicted for conspiring to defraud a savings and loan
association. Before and during trial the district court entered discovery
orders requiring the government to make available to defense counsel
exculpatory evidence.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found
that the prosecutor's failure to comply with the discovery orders was the
result of the prosecutor's inexperience rather than bad faith and that the
defendants had not been prejudiced by the prosecutor's actions. The
court noted that where a defendant moves in mid-trial for a mistrial or
dismissal on grounds unrelated to his guilt or innocence, as was the case
here, the government may appeal a ruling in favor of the defendant
without offending the double jeopardy clause.
United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Erwin, asserted on appeal that: (1) the district court
erred in holding that he lacked standing to challenge the stop and
search of a car in which he was a passenger; (2) the traffic stop was a
pretext to conduct an illegal drug search; and (3) his consent to the
search was involuntary.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court held that Erwin, a passenger, had sufficient fourth amendment interest to challenge the traffic stop. The court reasoned that passengers
also have interests against unreasonable seizure of their persons. Second, the court held that Erwin lacked standing to challenge the search
because he failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
automobile. Thus, his fourth amendment rights were not violated by the
search. Third, the court held that the traffic stop was legal and not
pretextual: under identical circumstances, a reasonable officer would
have stopped a vehicle exceeding the speed limit by twelve miles solely
for the traffic violation. Based on the foregoing conclusions, the court
found it unnecessary to consider whether consent to the search was
voluntary.
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First NationalBank of Tulsa v. United States, 865 F.2d 217
Author: Judge Barrett
The Freeman Educational Association ("FEA"), appealed the district court's denial of its motions both to quash grand jury subpoenas
requesting bank acco'unt information and for return of property seized
by criminal investigators of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that since a presumption of regularity attaches to grand jury subpoenas and since the FEA

did not meet its burden of showing irregularity, the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction to issue the subpoenas. Further, the
government's need for the seized records in order to investigate criminal tax evasion charges was held to be compelling, and thus outweighed
the FEA's first amendment rights. Finally, the court held that since the
FEA was neither under arrest nor indictment, its case was not in esse.

Consequently, the district court's order denying FEA's motion for return of property was a final appealable order, properly heard by this
court.
United States v. Garcia, 879 F.2d 803
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant Garcia, pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing a
controlled substance of less than one kilogram in 1986. The district
court subsequently sentenced Garcia, requiring him to serve a term of
special parole. Garcia appealed, arguing that the term of special parole
was illegal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
explained that the applicable penalty provision for Garcia's offense was
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (b)(1)(A). This provision required offenders to serve a
term of special parole. In 1984, however, congress deleted the special
parole term. Congress stated that the deletion of special parole would
become effective November 1, 1987, for offenses involving under one
kilogram. For offenses involving over one kilogram, the deletion of special parole would become effective in 1984. Following Congress' guidelines, the court held that Garcia must serve a term of special parole. The
court reasoned that Garcia's offense involved under one kilogram, and
further, Garcia committed the offense in 1986.
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185
Author: Judge Conway, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge Logan
Defendant, Hopkinson, who was sentenced to death for first degree
murder, petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition, and Hopkinson appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part, staying
Hopkinson's death warrant until the district court issued further orders.
The court held that prosecutor Shillinger's introduction of evidence of
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prior crimes, wrongs, or acts was properly admitted because it illustrated Hopkinson's motive. In addition, the court held that the confrontation clause was not violated when Shillinger introduced the murder
victims' out-of-court statements, which included threats by Hopkinson.

Also, the court stated that Shillinger's dosing comments declaring that
he thought Hopkinson, rather than the hired killer, was morally responsible for the victim's death, was an improper statement. The court held,
however, that such a comment did not affect the fairness of the trial,
considering the overwhelming amount of proof against Hopkinson.
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286
Author: Judge Anderson
Dissent: Judge Logan, with whom Chief Judge Holloway
and Judges McKay and Seymour join
Defendant, Hopkinson, was convicted on four counts of first degree
murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
Hopkinson's appeal to the district court was summarily dismissed. A
panel of the Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed on virtually all issues,
and affirmed with one dissent on the subject matter of this en bane review. Hopkinson v. Shillinger,866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'ggranted,
March 23, 1989. The Tenth Circuit thereafter agreed to consider en bane
whether remarks by the State in the deaih sentencing proceeding violated the rule set out in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). In
Caldwell, the Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to mislead the jury into thinking the ultimate determination of death rests with
someone else.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Caldwell decision, which was decided after Hopkinson's death sentence became final, announced a "new
rule." The court stated that this "new rule" could only be applied retroactively to Hopkinson if it fell within one of tivo exceptions. The court
held that the "new rule" fell within the second exception and therefore
could be retroactively applied to Hopkinson. This exception requires
observance of "procedures that . . are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989). The court
reasoned that the jury's understanding of its function in a death sentence proceeding is related to the concept of ordered liberty. Even
though the "new rule" applied to Hopkinson, the court was equally divided as to whether the State's remarks violated the "new rule." In particular, the court was split as to whether the remarks shifted "the
responsibility for the sentencing decision away from the jury." Parks v.
Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1549 (10th Cir. 1988)(en bane), cert. granted, 109
S.Ct. 1930- (1989). The court ruled that its equal division had the effect
of affirming the district court's denial of Hopkinson's petition on this
issue. The court also added that Hopkinson's death sentence must not
be vacated because there was not a substantial possibility that the State's
remarks affected the jury's sentencing decision.
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United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331
Author: Judge Moore
The Government sought a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent,
Jenkins, to impose the mandatory enhanced sentence of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) against defendant, Mendes, following his conviction for
possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district
court based its refusal to apply the enhanced sentence provision on the
lack of a jury finding on the quantity of narcotics possessed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's refusal to apply the
minimum enhanced sentence Was a usurpation ofjudicial authority and
resulted in an illegal sentence. The court reasoned that since the quantity requirement of section 841(b)(1)(B) applies only to sentencing and
is not an element of the substantive offense, the Government need not
prove essential quantities beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
has no right to a finding by the jury that the fact has been established.
There was evidence that Mendes had immediate and constructive possession of sufficient quantities of narcotics to satisfy the requirements of
the enhanced sentencing provision.
The court found that issuance of a writ was proper because the
crime was committed prior to the effective date of a statute providing for
direct appeal of sentences imposed in violation of law, and a motion to
correct the sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) would have been fruitless since the district court had already rejected the Government's
position.
Kaiser v. Lief 874 F.2d 732
Author: Judge O'Conner, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Kaiser, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Lief. Kaiser appealed and argued
that: (1) the search of his home was conducted pursuant to an invalid
warrant; (2) furs were improperly seized during a search for drugs; and
(3) the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding Lief's liability for the acts of others while a detective lieutenant.
The Tenth Circuit held that the search warrant was valid. The court
found that the affidavit underlying the search warrant and the complaint
on which the arrest warrant was based provided sufficient indications
that the confidential informant was reliable. Together, the facts gave the
magistrate a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed.
On de novo review, the court held that seizure of the furs was proper
under the plain view doctrine. The doctrine applied because: (1) the
compartment searched could have contained the drugs sought; (2) Lief
did not intend to seize the furs when he applied for the warrant; and
(3) there was immediate probable cause to believe that the furs were
stolen. Finally, the court held that the district court's refusal of Kaiser's
proposed instruction was proper even though the instruction could have
resulted in Lief's liability for the acts of others.
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United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992
Author: Judge Moore
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Keiswetter, sought to vacate his original guilty plea. The
district court denied the motion concluding that Keiswetter had not
stated a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the record did not
contain the required factual basis for the plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 (f). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that a
guilty plea improvidently accepted by the district court without sufficient
factual basis for the plea must be vacated.
Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 250
Author: Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Klein, appealed the district court's denial of both a petition
for a writ of coram nobis and a FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) motion for a new
trial.
The petition for coram nobis relief was based upon new evidence
which showed that the government withheld its belief that Klein was financing narcotics deals. Moreover, the evidence showed that Klein had a
mental condition in the Navy which would have assisted him in proving
he was not able to form an intent to evade taxes. The burden of proof
was on Klein to show that the errors to be corrected resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice and that the new evidence would have resulted in his acquittal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's denial on procedural
grounds. On the merits, the court held Klein was not denied a fair trial
since the narcotics related evidence would have hindered his case. In
addition, Klein's history of mental incapacity was known to Klein prior
to trial. Klein's psychiatric witness indicated his testimony would be unchanged even in light of that evidence. The court affirmed the district
court.

The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Klein's Rule
60(b)(5) motion for a new trial. Klein was disbarred prior to the tax evasion trial and in 1988 was reinstated to the practice of law when it was
determined -that his mental health was restored. Although the disbarment was introduced at the tax evasion trial, there was also other strong
evidence that Klein intended to evade taxes. The court upheld the district court's ruling that the 1988 reinstatement did not affect the criminal case verdict. The court denied equitable relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
since Klein had not demonstrated that this was an extraordinary case
calling for relief under the rule.
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United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720
Author: Judge Ebel
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Koonce, appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss a federal indictment against him in Utah on the grounds
that some of the alleged criminal misconduct underlying the Utah prosecution was used to enhance Koonce's sentence for a prior conviction in
South Dakota.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, and found no violation of the fifth
amendment double jeopardy ban on multiple prosecutions or the federal sentencing guidelines because the Utah offense was different from
the one Koonce was convicted for in South Dakota. Though the South
Dakota district court inquired into the Utah offense during sentencing,
the court ruled that Koonce was never put in jeopardy for the Utah offense during the South Dakota sentencing hearing. As for Koonce's argument that he was subject to multiple punishments in violation of the
double jeopardy clause, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the issue was not
ripe for review, unless or until Koonce was convicted in Utah.
United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Kornegay, appealed his conviction for interstate transportation and sale of a stolen farm tractor. Kornegay based his appeal
on the failure of the court to suppress evidence allegedly seized during
an illegal search, and the failure to grant his motion for a mistrial, based
on intentional misconduct by the prosecutor.
The first argument revolved around whether the impounding and
inventory search of Kornegay's vehicle was proper. The Tenth Circuit
ruled that simply because Koregay's car was legally parked did not
mean impoundment was unnecessary, and that the facts supported that
the impounding of the car was proper and reasonable. The court also
ruled that since the evidence in question resulted from an initial routine
inventory, to secure the vehicle and protect Kornegay's property, the
evidence was obtained in a proper and reasonable manner. The court
summarily disposed of the second claim because though there was
prosecutorial misconduct, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184
Author: Judge Wright, sitting by designation
Defendant, Laycock, plead guilty to armed robbery with a firearm
enhancement in exchange for dismissal of another charge. Laycock appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary
guilty plea, because his attorney misrepresented the consequences of
the plea agreement.
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The Tenth Circuit held that Laycock failed to prove that his attorney materially misrepresented the consequences of the plea agreement.
Laycock signed the agreement, following an explanation by the trial
judge, and he denied that any other promises had been made in exchange for his plea. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Laycock
needed to establish that his attorney's performance was deficient and
that, but for counsel's errors, Laycock would have insisted on going to
trial. The court held that Laycock had failed to prove either of these
elements. Among its findings, the court concluded that the attorney's
advice to accept the plea bargain was reasonable, given that Laycock admitted committing the crimes charged, was identified by witnesses, and
had a prior record. The court also rejected Laycock's claims that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and that he received an inadequate sentencing hearing. The court affirmed dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition.
United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Maez, was suspected of being involved in a bank robbery. Maez and his wife voluntarily left their home and surrendered to
the authorities when they realized their home was surrounded by police
officers. Maez was then placed under arrest. The police did not have an
arrest warrant, nor did they have a warrant to search his trailer and
truck. Rather, the police contended that Maez's wife consented to a
search of the trailer and truck. Maez motioned to suppress evidence
seized during the search, but it was denied. Maez subsequently appealed, arguing: (1) the warrantless arrest violated his fourth amendment rights; and (2) the consent to search his trailer was not voluntary.
First, the Tenth Circuit stated that without consent police officers
cannot enter a home to make a warrantless routine felony arrest, even
with probable cause, in the absence of exigent circumstances. Even
though the officers did not enter Maez's home, the court reasoned that
Maez was coerced into leaving his home. The court found no exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless arrest. Second, the court stated
that Mrs. Maez's consent to search the trailer was an act of free will only
if there was a break in the casual connection between the illegality and
the evidence obtained. The court found no intervening events between
the time of Maez's arrest and the signing of the consent form. Consequently, the court held that Mrs. Maez's consent to search the trailer was
not an act of free will. In addition, the court considered three factors in
determining whether Mrs. Maez consented to a search of their truck:
(1) the proximity of Maez arrest and consent given; (2) the effect of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Based on these three factors, the court held the consent
was not sufficiently an act of free will.
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United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Mann, appealed conviction of four counts of mail fraud,
one count of wire fraud and three counts of willful failure to file income
tax returns, challenging the sufficiency of evidence on all counts.
The Tenth Circuit affir-med Mann's mail fraud conviction, holding
that substantial evidence existed whereby the jury could conclude that
Mann made false representations with knowledge of or indifference to
the possibility of their falsity. The court reversed the wire fraud conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence used to prove criminal intent was too attenuated. The court reversed and remanded the willful
failure to fie conviction because although there was sufficient evidence
to convict, Mann was prejudiced by the district court's failure to instruct
the jury regarding Mann's "good-faith" defense.
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the district court did not improperly refuse to admit magazines that supported Mann's legal position, nor did it erroneously admit testimony of a summary witness for
the government. Moreover, Mann's prosecution was not impermissively
selective, and there was no evidence that governmental misconduct prevented Mann from receiving a fair trial.
United States v. Martinez, 877 F.2d 1480
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Martinez, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and to possess heroin with an intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and use of a telephone to facilitate the possession
and distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 3(b) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Martinez appealed both counts.
The government conceded that because of faulty jury instructions
the conviction under the second count had to be reversed and the sentence vacated.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the conspiracy conviction, holding
that the jury did not convict Martinez on a guilt-by-association basis, due
to her joint trial with other codefendants. The government's evidence,
both from testimony and recorded telephone conversations, was held
sufficient to establish Martinez's participation in the conspiracy. The
conduct of a fellow defendant was not adequately prejudical or irregular
to justify a separate retrial and the court affirmed Martinez's conviction
of conspiracy.
United States v. Martinez, 890 F.2d 1088
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Martinez, appealed from a conviction for failure to appear after being released on bail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2).
Martinez was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine.
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After sentencing, Martinez was granted an appeal bond. His conviction
was later affirmed and the district court informed Martinez by letter of
his surrender date. Martinez failed to surrender and was later arrested.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that failure to appear is a continuing offense which need not be complete on the surrender date.
Therefore, the prosecutor was not required to prove an exact date for
the. offense. The court conduded that Martinez knowingly failed to appear since notice of his surrender date had been mailed to him by both
the district court and his attorney. Evidence of Martinez's prior conviction for conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine and his pending
indictment for new cocaine charges was properly admitted by the district
court to show motive to commit the offense of bail jumping. The potential prejudice of this evidence to Martinez did not substantially outweigh
its probative value. Finally, the court considered two comments made by
the prosecutor during his dosing argument and concluded that neither
remark was improper when reviewed in the context of the entire record.
United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, McKinnell, was convicted for using a firearm during or
in relation to a drug trafficking crime and for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. McKinnell appealed, arguing that: (1) the district
court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained during a search of
his automobile in violation of his fourth amendment rights; (2) possession with intent to distribute is not a felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(2)(amended 1988) because it does not involve the actual distribution, manufacture, or importation of drugs; (3) the mere presence of a
firearm constituted insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) because the statute penalizes a person who "uses
or carries" a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and
(4) the district court erred in admitting a prior criminal act into evidence
for the purpose of showing intent.
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit held that
the search of McKinnell's car was valid because it occurred pursuant to a
lawful custodial arrest. Therefore, it was also proper for the police to
examine the passenger compartment and any containers found within.
The court further held that possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute that substance is a valid predicate offense for the
purposes of the section 924(c)(1). Furthermore, the court stated that the
"uses" element of section 924(c)(1) was satisfied because McKinnell had
"ready access" to the firearm and it was an integral part of the criminal
undertaking. Finally, the court held that there was no error in admitting
a prior criminal act committed by McKinnell. Since intent was at issue,
testimony concerning McKinnell's recent and similar criminal activity
was probative of his intent.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:4

United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1167
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, McNeal, was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113
which makes it a crime to take money by force from a "[s]tate-chartered
credit union the accounts of which are insured by the... National Credit
Union Administration ["NCUA"]." (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit held that use of the term "deposits" instead of
"accounts" in the indictment was not sufficient cause to grant a motion
to dismiss for failing to charge a crime. The court also held that proof of
federal insurance of the institution, in order to qualify for federal jurisdiction of the case, was adequately shown by an insurance certificate
from the NCUA to the credit union's predecessor, evidence that insurance premiums were paid each year even though no updated certificate
was issued, and testimony from a senior vice-president that the institution was federally insured on the date of the robbery. In addition, an
instruction to the jury that if McNeal was found guilty of the robbery he
must also be found guilty of assault with a handgun was not plain error,
as is required on appeal when the objection was not first raised at trial.
Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected as unnecessary an instruction regarding the possible infirmities of eyewitness testimony where the case was supported by testimony of multiple witnesses
and other corroborating evidence.
United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1173
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, McNeal, and his brother were both convicted of armed
robbery of a state-chartered credit union which had federally insured
deposits. McNeal appealed, asserting that: (1) the district court's failure
to sever his trial from his brother's trial was reversible error; and (2) the
district court erred in denying his post-trial motion for permission to
query the jurors.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's denial of McNeal's
motion to sever was not reversible error. The court stated that as a general rule joint participants in a criminal act can expect to be tried together and indicted together. This holds true even if the joint
participants are brothers. The court further held that the district court
did not err in denying McNeal's motion to query the jury without holding a hearing. The court stated that pursuant to local rule, a hearing
need not be held when such a motion is insufficient on its face. The
court addressed additional matters in its opinion for the appeal of McNeal's brother at 865 F.2d 1167.
United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, the United States, appealed from an order of the district
court granting defendant Miller's motion for a new trial under Fed. R.
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Crim. P. 33. Miller, convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, filed a motion 'for reconsideration twenty-one months after the final judgment,
asking the district court to reconsider its prior denial of a motion for a
new trial. Believing Miller had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
the district court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the order and held that pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, Miller was required to file a petition to
reconsider the denial of a motion for a new trial within ten days of entry
of the judgment or order, absent a showing that evidence of the alleged
ineffectiveness was not available to Miller at the time of trial. Finding
that the facts showing the adequacy of trial preparation were available to
Miller at the time of trial, the court found the motion defective for lack
ofjurisdiction.
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866
Per Curiam
Defendants, Mobile Materials, Inc. ("Mobile"), Mobile Materials
Co. ("Partnership"), and Philpot, were indicted on seven counts for conspiracy to submit rigged bids to, or withhold from, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation and the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, in
violation of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the indictment against Mobile and the Partnership on the ground that they were
dissolved more than two years prior. After appeal to the Tenth Circuit,
contesting the dismissal, the district court was ordered to conduct further proceedings in the prosecution of Mobile, the Partnership, and
Philpot. Philpot and Mobile were subsequently convicted of violating
the Sherman Act, and were convicted of one count of making false and
fraudulent statements to the United States Department of Transportation. Philpot and Mobile raised four issues on appeal: (1) whether the
case should have been submitted to the jury on a theory of grand conspiracy to rig bids; (2) whether the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 161317(e), was violated by the protracted length of the prosecution;
(3) whether the trial judge's attitude and demeanor convinced the jury
that the judge thought the defendants were guilty; and (4) whether the
sentences were grossly disproportionate.
First, the Tenth Circuit found that all of the essential elements of a
conspiracy under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were established
to allege an antitrust violation. Second, the court examined the course
of the proceedings prior to trial, tracking the excludable and non-exdudable days under the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that judicial economy and procedural fairness permitted Philpot, based on his
relationship with Mobile and the Partnership, ajoint trial. Moreover, the
delay in prosecution was held to be both reasonable and mathematically
correct (50 elapsed days of the 70 limit). Third, in absence of a complete
transcript, the court was not able to rule on the allegations of judicial

misconduct. Finally, in a review of the severity of the sentence imposed,
the court found no abuse of the district court's discretion in meting out
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punishment, finding the sanctions all within contemplation of statutory
provisions of the Sherman Act. The district court's decision was, therefore, affirmed.
Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Nieto, appealed the district court's order dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for assault,
battery, and armed robbery.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that testimony by the arresting
officer which made reference to mug shots did not deny Nieto of a fair
trial in light of his own testimony that he had been previously arrested
and was presently incarcerated. The prosecutor's statements regarding
an "object focus" phenomenon did not deprive Nieto of due process
because his counsel disavowed any objection to the phenomenon and
used it to defendant's advantage. Additionally, the prosecutor's references to another alleged victim who did not testify did not deny Nieto a
fair trial because the prosecutor's comments were in response to defense counsel's closing remarks, the jury was properly instructed, and an
objection was properly sustained by the trial court. The trial judge had a
substantial reason for partial closure, and properly conducted a hearing
where the circumstances were discussed. Therefore, the court held that
the closure of the court to Nieto's relatives during the testimony of the
victim did not deny Nieto a fair trial.
United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1470
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Nunez, was convicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin and for using the telephone to facilitate the crime. Nunez
appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence from a wiretap on his brother's phone; (2) the evidence showed two conspiracies, entitling Nunez to two separate trials;
(3) the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.
The Tenth Circuit stated that wiretap authorizations are presumed
proper, and the defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption. Nunez was unable to prove that there was no probable cause, nor
any need for the wiretap. Second, the court rejected Nunez's claim that
the evidence showed two conspiracies. The court held that there was a
single conspiracy based on the finding that all participants shared a common goal: to possess and distribute heroin for profit. Third, the court
upheld the district court's denial of Nunez's motion for mistrial. The
court held that the ousting of Nunez's brother from the courtroom for
improper behavior was not prejudicial to his case. The court found no
abuse of discretion by the district court. Finally, the court found that
there was sufficient evidence to support Nunez's conviction.
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United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Nunez, argued that the district court violated his fifth
amendment rights when he was removed from trial for disruptive conduct. Nunez also argued that his sixth amendment rights were violated
when the district court refused to remove appointed counsel, and precluded Nunez from appearing pro se.
The Tenth Circuit held that Nunez's fifth amendment rights were
not violated. The court reasoned that a defendant in a criminal proceeding can waive his right to be present at trial if his disruptive behavior
continues following a judge's warning. The court also found that it was
too late to appoint new counsel. Moreover, had Nunez been allowed to
proceed pro se and been removed, he would have been unrepresented.
The district court's decision was, therefore, affirmed.
Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Peters, was arrested in Colorado on a British warrant alleging theft by deception and forgery. The United States Magistrate ordered his extradition and the district court denied Peters' petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Peters appealed the denial, and argued that there
was not probable cause to extradite him, and that the doctrine of dual
criminality was not satisfied.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the committing magistrate must decide whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial. The magistrate need not determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction. The habeas
corpus review of the magistrate's finding of probable cause is narrow: appeal must fail if there is any evidence of probable cause.
The Tenth Circuit held there was sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for both charges. The court also upheld the lower
courts' finding that the theft by deception statute was substantially
analogous to federal securities laws.
United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
Three appeals were consolidated for argument. First, defendant,
Hines, appealed his five-count conviction for violating and conspiring to
violate narcotics laws and traveling in interstate commerce to promote
narcotics manufacturing. Hines argued that the district court's failure to
declare a mistrial was prejudicial because the jury heard evidence of his
prior felony conviction. In addition, Hines claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the
"Travel Act"). Moreover, Hines argued that the district court abused its
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discretion after granting a continuance as a sanction for the government's violation of discovery orders, rather than imposing a more extreme sanction.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's denial of Hines' motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that
the jury was given a cautionary instruction. Moreover, Hines gave testimony regarding his record. The court concluded that there was suffident evidence for the jury to find Hines guilty of violating the Travel
Act. Finally, the court ruled that the district court's use of the less extreme sanction of continuance was not an abuse of discretion, where
there was no evidence of prejudice to Hines.
Second, defendant, Peveto, appealed his conviction for conspiracy.
Peveto claimed that evidence found in A search of his apartment should
have been suppressed because the affidavit in support of the warrant was
insufficient to establish probable cause. Moreover, Peveto contended
that the executing officers used excessive force. Pevet6 also challenged
the admission of testimony by a co-conspirator and the admission of a
traffic ticket which tied him to the conspiracy. Peveto argued that there
was insufficient evidence to establish that he was a member of the
conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied
Peveto's motion to dismiss. The court found that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the
warrant. Also, there was a substantial basis for conduding that the police did not use excessive force. The court ruled that the co-conspirator
testimony was properly admitted. The court reasoned that the testimony
at issue may be considered in making the determination to admit, subject to being connected up later. The court concluded that the evidence,
although circumstantial, was sufficient for the jury to find that Peveto
knowingly joined the conspiracy. The court found that the traffic ticket,
offered as circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy, and not to prove
the truth of the facts asserted, was not hearsay.
Third, defendant, Rodgers, appealed his four-count conviction for
violating and conspiring to violate narcotics laws. Rodgers claimed that
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever
under FED. R. CRim. P. 14. The court found that Hines' and Rodgers'
defenses were so antagonistic as to be mutually exdusive, and that the
district court's failure to grant a severance denied Rodgers a fair trial.
The court concluded that this was prejudicial error.
Finally, all three defendants challenged the sufficiency of proof as to
the existence of a single conspiracy. The court ruled, however, that the
jury could reasonably have found that the evidence established a single
conspiracy. The convictions of Hines and Peveto were affirmed. Rodgers' conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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United States v. Pogue, 865 F.2d 226
Per Curiam
Defendant, Pogue, appealed the denial without hearing of his motion to vacate conviction or correct sentence. Pogue's sentence imposed
restitution far in excess of the maximum fine of which he was informed
during the plea-bargaining stage. Pogue insisted he would not have pled
guilty if he had been warned by the district court prior to sentencing that
he could be required to pay restitution. Further, Pogue claimed he did
not withdraw his guilty plea because he believed a change of plea was
impermissible.
The Tenth Circuit held that Pogue was entitled to an explanation of
the possibility of restitution prior to entering his guilty plea, and that he
had demonstrated a substantial violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Therefore, the court vacated the denial of Pogue's motion and remanded this
issue to the district court. The court held, however, that the district
court's imposition of restitution was not a breach of the plea agreement,
which provided that the government would bring no further charges but
contained no provision regarding sentencing. In addition, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in calculating restitution since Pogue
had stipulated on record to the amount imposed.
United States v. Prichard,875 F.2d 789
Per Curiam
Defendant, Prichard, moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Prichard alleged: (1) a violation of
FED. R. CGlM. P. 23(A), which resulted in his nonvoluntary waiver of a
jury trial; (2) the application of "attempt" was unconstitutionally vague
as applied; and (3) a misapplication of the relevant legal standards in
determining his guilt. The district court denied Prichard's motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Prichard subsequently appealed
and reasserted the same grounds for relief. Prichard further asked for
recusal of the district judge.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the lack of a document memorializing Prichard's waiver of ajury trial did not result in anything less than
a knowing, intelligent waiver. The court also held that Prichard's second
and third issues on appeal were fairly encompassed in his direct appeal.
Absent an intervening change in the law of a circuit, issues disposed of
on direct appeal generally will not be considered on a collateral attack
by a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Moreover, the court held that
Prichard's allegations of bias and prejudice, because of the judge's prior
judicial contacts with Prichard, were insufficient to support recusal. The
judgment of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Rising, was convicted of murder with premeditation and
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malice aforethought and unlawful possession'of a knife in a penitentiary.
Rising appealed the convictions, presenting twelve various grounds for
reversal. Rising's major contention was that the district court judge
committed reversible error by refusing to allow two fellow inmates to
testify as to threats made by the victim against Rising. The purpose of
this testimony was to establish Rising's claim of self-defense.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that since the district court had allowed
other inmates to testify as to communicated threats by the victim on Rising's life, the evidence would have been cumulative. The court held that
the district court had not abused its discretion to exclude the cumulative
evidence. Finding no reversible error, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261
Author: Judge A. Anderson, sitting by designation
Defendant, Rivera, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, alleging that: (1) the police officer
stopped the vehicle as a pretext, without probable cause for the stop or
highway search; and (2) the search was invalid for failing to meet the
legal standards for a search incident to an arrest.
Affirming the district court's denial of Rivera's motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the highway search, the Tenth Circuit held that
the initial stop and investigation for a traffic violation was lawfully made.
This stop occurred after a truck driver notified the officer that a car was
tailgating him. During the stop the officer noticed a smell associated
with cocaine. The officer then asked for and received consent to search
the car. The search turned up several packages of cocaine. The court
concluded that this highway search could not be upheld as a search incident to an arrest because probable cause was not present until the
search and seizure produced evidence of drugs. However, the highway
search was properly performed following Rivera's voluntary verbal consent. The court also held that the district court was not clearly erroneous
in denying suppression of evidence from the highway search even
though written consent for a subsequent gas station search was found to
be invalid.
United States v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917
Per Curiam
Defendant, Shunk, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
felon. On appeal, Shunk argued: (1) that the district court erred in admitting into evidence a videotape of his admissions before the government's establishment of the corpus delicti, and (2) that the videotape of
the sting officer's conversation with Shunk's brother, even if not inadmissible hearsay, failed to corroborate Shunk's admissions.
In upholding the conviction, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the corpus
delicti issue was irrelevant because of the nature of the crime: there was
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no tangible injury or loss and the occurrence of the crime was inseparable from the identity of the specific defendant. The court instead applied
the corroboration rule, requiring the prosecution to present evidence
establishing the trustworthiness of the extrajudicial statements, but not
requiring that the corroborating evidence be sufficient independently to
establish the corpus delicti. The court held that the government had
presented sufficient corroborating evidence.
Affirming the conviction, the court ruled that a reasonable jury
could find that Shunk had knowingly possessed a firearm and that
Shunk's brother's statements were admissible as statements offered
against a party which are made by the party's agent.
United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245
Author: Judge Moore
Trooper Moore stopped defendant, Silkwood, for speeding and
then saw a loaded gun in Silkwood's glove compartment. The district
court denied Silkwood's motion to suppress the gun, and Silkwood appealed. Silkwood also appealed the district court's decision to prevent
him from examining Moore's personnel file. In addition, Silkwood argued that he did not waive his right to counsel when he decided to appear pro se rather than accept appointed counsel.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err is
refusing to suppress evidence of the gun. The court stated that the district court's decision was proper under the plain view exception to the
fourth amendment. Second, the court upheld the district court's decision to prevent Silkwood from examining Moore's personnel fie. Third,
the court stated that if a defendant waives his sixth amendment right to
counsel, the court must conduct a penetrating and comprehensive inquiry into his reasons for the waiver. Moreover, the court must question
the defendant on the record to be certain that waiver of counsel was
truly knowing and voluntary. The court found that Silkwood did not
knowingly and volutarily waive his right to counsel. The court explained
that the district court failed to inquire adequately into Silkwood's understanding of his waiver.
United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Smith, appealed his conviction of bank robbery on the
ground that the district court erred by not giving a cautionary jury instruction regarding the testimony of a paid informant. Smith also appealed the sentence imposed by the district court, which departed form
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Smith argued that he
did not receive notice of the grounds for departure, and he argued that
the departure was unreasonable.
First, the Tenth Circuit upheld Smith's conviction. The court reasoned that even if the rejection of the defendant's instruction was erro-
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neous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the
substantial evidence identifying Smith as the bank robber. Second, the
court vacated and remanded for resentencing because of the district
court's insufficient statement of the reasons for its departure from the
Guidelines. The court stated that specificity of reason is mandated by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c). The court failed to comment on the notice or unreasonableness issues.
United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Thomas, convicted of possession -with intent to distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana, appealed his sentence,
daiming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 991 et. seq. violated his fifth amendment due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that the guidelines did not violate Thomas'
rights. First, there is no constitutional right to have a judge make a discretionary individualized sentence determination. Congress has the
power to divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and to establish
exact mandatory sentences for all sentences. Second, the guidelines do
not deprive defendants of meaningful participation in the sentencing
process because they allow defendants to appear, offer evidence and
challenge the government's evidence. Third, although a prosecutor has
the discretion to determine what charges to bring, the guidelines do not
grant him improper control of a defendant's sentence simply because
the evidence will support conviction under more than one statute.
Thomas' sentence was affirmed.
Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877
Per Curiam
Defendant, Tucker, appealed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus after he was convicted of robbery and kidnapping at successive trials.
Tucker's appeal raised three principal issues: whether his successive trials arising from the same transaction violated double jeopardy; whether
the introduction of "other crimes" evidence violated due process; and
whether the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals not to apply
remedial state precedent violated a constitutional right.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that successive trials arising from separate crimes stemming from the
same transaction may have violated the "fundamental fairness" standards for successive prosecutions. This violated due process and double
jeopardy, thereby necessitating a reversal of the district court's findings
as to these claims. The court further held that on remand the district
court should consider whether evidence of other crimes or wrongs was
introduced at Tucker's trials. Finally, the court affirmed the district court
decision not,to retroactively apply Oklahoma remedial precedent which
allows joinder of indictments. The application of this precedent was a
state law issue not to be disturbed on review.
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United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Walraven, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. This plea, however, was conditional. Wal-aven
maintained the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence found in a warrantless search of his car. Walraven
argued that the initial registration check of his out-of-state vehicle violated the privileges and immunities-clause. He also contended that the
initial stop of his vehicle, undertaken when the dispatcher mistakenly
checked the wrong license plate number, was an unreasonable mistake
of fact, or merely support for a pretextual stop. Further, Walraven argued that even if the initial stop of his car was lawful, its continued detention after discovery of the mistake, was not. Finally, Walraven
asserted that he did not consent to the search of his car.
The Tenth Circuit held that a random registration check of an outof-state vehicle does not violate the privileges and immunities clause.
The court reasoned that the check neither unreasonably burdens nor
restricts interstate travel. The court also found that the initial stop of
Walraven's car was not an unlawful seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. The court reasoned that the officer's failure to notice and
correct the dispatcher's mistake was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. The court held that the continued detention of Walraven's car was an investigative detention which was reasonable in light
of Walraven's suspicious behavior. Governmental interests in crime prevention and detection outweigh the minimally intrusive character of the
detention. Finally, the court declined to review the question of whether
Walraven consented to the search of his car. The court reasoned that
this was a question of fact for the trial judge who heard the witnesses'
testimony. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walraven's
motion to suppress.
United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Defendant, Willis, appealed his conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, and his conviction for unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate distribution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C § 843(b). Willis contended that the
district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress a wiretap;
(2) denying his motion for acquittal; (3) overruling his objection to the
prosecution's introduction of rebuttal evidence; and (4) instructing the
jury on the application of complicity law to conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision in all respects. The use of wiretaps in the case was acceptable because the minimization effort by the government had been reasonable. In considering
Willis' motion for acquittal, the court found that Willis had enough
knowledge to connect him to part of the conspiracy and that evidence of
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his use of the telephone during a specific conversation was sufficient to
sustain his conviction for unlawful use of the telephone. The court
found that the admission of rebuttal testimony did not constitute an
abuse of discretion by the district court. The proper standard of review
on jury instructions is whether the jury, considering the instructions as a
whole, was misled. The court found no likelihood that the jury was misled, and refused to disturb the district court's determination on the
instructions.

